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trial, upon a showing that the jury has received evidence out of court
or that any of the jurors have been guilty of misconduct.
In view of this practice of pennitting jurors to read nonprejudicial
publications, it would appear that Florida is aligned with decisions
in other jurisdictions.- 7 To obtain a reversal of conviction the defendant should prove (1) that he has been prejudiced by the publication, (2) that the jurors read the prejudicial newspapers, and (3)
that the jurors could not render a fair and impartial verdict after
having been exposed to the prejudicial matter. If the defendant is
successful in establishing these points, a new trial is granted. It may
be concluded, therefore, that reading of newspapers in the jury room
by Florida jurors does not constitute reversible error unless thereby
the defendant is denied his constitutional right of trial by a fair
and impartial jury.18
G.

ELIZABETH TAYLOR

CRIMINAL LAW: PERSONAL JURISDICTION OBTAINED
BY KIDNAPING
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 509 (1952)
Petitioner, convicted of murder in a Michigan state court, sought a
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court on the ground that
his abduction in Illinois by Michigan law enforcement officers and
forcible return to Michigan to stand trial violated the Federal Kidnaping Act' and his rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the writ on the ground
that the manner of acquiring personal jurisdiction is immaterial,
but the court of appeals reversed on the authority of the Federal
Kidnaping Act.2 On certiorari, HELD, neither the Federal Kidnaping
Act nor the due process clause invalidates respondent's conviction.
Judgment of the district court reinstated.
It is settled that an otherwise valid conviction of crime, even
17North v. State,

...

So.2d-...

(Fla. 1952); Shepherd v. State, 46 So.2d

880 (Fla. 1950).
1SFLA.

CONsT. Decl. of Rights §11.

118 U.S.C. §1201 (Supp. 1952).
2Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951).
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though jurisdiction of the person is obtained by illegal means, is not
thereby vitiated. 3 This principle, here applied by the Court, rests
on two bases: first, the vital interest of a state in enforcing its criminal
law, an interest far more important than the private interest of the
criminal whose rights may be violated; and, second, the remedy afforded the accused in the form of a civil right of action against his
abductors, regardless of conviction or acquittal.' From the due process standpoint, according to the principle followed in the instant
case, observance of the customary procedural safeguards after jurisdiction of the person has been obtained furnishes adequate protection
to the individual.
The court of appeals, in refusing to accept the reasoning of the
prior decisions, held that the Federal Kidnaping Act invalidates a
conviction based on jurisdiction obtained by abduction, arguing that
to hold otherwise would encourage violation of criminal statutes by
the very officers sworn to enforce them.5 This particular statute has
not been construed previously as to its application to law enforcement
officers, but the words "or otherwise" in its clause reading "and held
for ransom or reward or 6therwise" has been construed in other circumstances to embrace any benefit whatsoever to the kidnaper. 6 Although the Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of the court
of appeals has still not held that an abduction under the instant circumstances violates the kidnaping act, nevertheless the opinion does
state, ".... we assume, without intimating that it is so, that the Michigan officers would have violated it if the facts are as alleged."
The extradition clause of the Constitution7 and its implementing
legislation,8 being unenforceable against a sovereign state,9 are directory
and not mandatory. This weakness leaves the offended state without
vindication whenever rendition of the accused for trial is refused or
speed in apprehending the fugitive becomes essential. Indeed, the
sPettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120 (1897);
Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700 (1888); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).

4See note 3 supra.
zCollins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464 (6th Cir. 1951); see United States v. Lee, 106

U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
eGooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
7U.S. CONsr. Art. IV, §2.
818 U.S.C. §3182 (Supp. 1952).
DKentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U.S. 1861). But see Drew v. Thaw, 235
US. 432, 439 (1914).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 4 [1952], Art. 8
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

instant opinion fails to indicate that Michigan even asked for
rendition.
Earlier judicial concern over the weakness of rendition and extradition proceduresO led to the passage of the Fugitive Felon Act,1
which authorizes federal agents to return fugitive criminals to the
federal judicial district embracing the site of the state crime for
federal prosecution as a fugitive' - and thereby complements the
extradition process.13 Under the principles of comity the state and
the United States can each prosecute for the separate crimes involved,
the state as regards the original violation of its law and the federal
court as regards the illegal flight across state lines.14 Proper use of the
extradition clause, the Fugitive Felon Act, or both, largely obviates
any need for kidnaping.
No one can deny either the inherent justice of bringing criminals
to trial or the importance of upholding the integrity of state prohibitions of criminal conduct, but to encourage law enforcement officers to violate the law themselves is hardly a sound means of effectuating these desirable ends.' 5 The instant doctrine has history behind
it but not logic.
On the one hand, if the state interest in convicting criminals is in
reality paramount, then why cannot all evidence, however obtained,
be used? If the evidence exists the accused has no more right to
complain of an illegal seizure of it than he has to protest against illegal seizure of his person. In either event he should be convicted
loPettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700
(1888); Dow's Case, 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 37 (1851).
1118 U.S.C. §1073 (Supp. 1952): "Whoever moves or travels in interstate
or foreign commerce with intent either (1) to avoid prosecution . . . under the
laws of the place from which he flees, for murder, kidnaping, burglary, robbery,
mayhem, rape, assault with a dangerous weapon, or extortion accompanied by
threats of violence, or attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses as they
are defined either at common law or by the laws of the place from which the
"
fugitive flees . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ....
"Violations of this section may be prosecuted only in the Federal judicial
"
district in which the original crime was alleged to have been committed ....
For a brief summary of the legislative history see United States v. Brandenburg,
144 F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir. 1944).
12United States v. Conley, 80 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1948).
".Middlemas v. District Court, 233 P.2d 1038 (Mont. 1951).
24United States v. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 65 (W.D. Ky. 1936).
'sSee McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943), for an enlightened
view of minimum standards of federal criminal procedure.
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if he committed the crime, according to the instant doctrine. Torture
is, of course, in a class by itself;16 from the standpoint of an accurate
trial the objection in most instances is not to the pain suffered but
rather to the falsity of the confession thereby produced.Y
On the other hand, if the purported rationale of distinction is an
inherent differentiation in importance between jurisdiction of the
person and the other essential parts of the trial, then why is such
differentiation not observed in civil trials? If the inducement to enter
a state is fraudulently obtained by the plaintiff for the purpose of
serving process, no jurisdiction of the person results even though
entry of the defendant was voluntary and intentional.' 8
Finally, the advisability of stirring up inter-police hostilities is
questionable. It is not unlikely that law enforcement officers in some
states, taking their duties seriously, will use violence in defending
their own jurisdiction. Most of the reported decisions, however, have
dealt with persons accused of aggravated or heinous crimes who have
been apprehended through the cooperation of the local and foreign
police.
The Court here should have stated flatly that abductions such as
occurred in this case are in themselves criminal violations of the
Federal Kidnaping Act. This would create a desirable restriction on
such acts which the Court seems to advocate yet is unwilling to
effectuate. With no such inhibitory restriction what is to prevent
judgment-proof law enforcement 'officers from roaming at will in
search of minor violators, thereby breaching one's right to freedom
from unlawful seizure?19
PAis G. SxNGER

16Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (193.
7Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
l8Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937).
19U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. See an excellent discussion of this point in Pettibone
v. Nichols, 203 US. 192, 217 (1906).
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